ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: IMPACTS ON GROWTH AND INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS

FRÉDÉRIC GONAND – SÉMINAIRE PSL – 18 NOVEMBRE 2015
THE QUESTION

What are the impacts on GDP growth and on intergenerational inequality of energy policies?

(*e.g.*, recycled carbon tax, support to renewables, higher energy efficiency, regulated end-use prices / oil production levels...).

• A long-run issue
  -> potential growth, solovian models, general equilibrium

• A demographic & theoretical issue
  -> overlapping-generations (OLG) models -> dynamic general equilibrium

• An empirically treated issue
  -> parameterization on real data

• An economic policy issue
  -> modeling social choice

• A geography-dependent issue
  -> European countries / Gulf countries
WHAT DOES THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE SAY ON THIS ISSUE? (1/2)


  However, literature often relies on static GE models that do not aim to account for intergenerational redistributive effects.


  However, literature often with theoretical approach + few generations + not mainly designed to analyze interactions between GE-CO2 nor social choice.
WHAT DOES THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE SAY ON THIS ISSUE? (2/2)

• -> empirical, dynamic GE with OLG+energy sector: much less literature. Carbone et al., 2012 / Carbone et al., 2013 / Rausch, 2013. Our model close to these references BUT with differences:
  o policies analyzed (renewables, energy efficiency gains, carbon emissions);
  o detailed demographics (annual data, 60 cohorts);
  o public finances (e.g., different ways of recycling a carbon tax, public spending influenced by ageing...);
  o social choice (e.g., optimal mix of policies, social welfare functionals...) (see Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2014) but without OLGs and no empirical parameterization).
  o parameterization on German & French data + another (modified) version on Saudi data (energy policies in oil exporting countries)(KAPSARC).
THE MODEL (1/3)


General Equilibrium model with an energy module...

– Electricity (wholesale price, network costs, FiT...), oil products, natural gas, coal.
– Production function with K, L and Energy (nested CES function)

\[
Y_t = \left[ \alpha (B_t E_t)^{\gamma_{en}} + (1 - \alpha) [C_t]^{\gamma_{en}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma_{en}}}
\]

\[
C_t = \left[ \alpha K_t^{1-\frac{1}{\beta}} + (1 - \alpha) [A_t \bar{Y}_t \Delta_t L_t]^{1-\frac{1}{\beta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\beta}}}
\]

– Models the impact of variables in the energy sector on growth, savings, L supply, K per unit of efficient labor, substitution between K and energy...
– Long-run macro equilibrium. 1 good (no input-output matrix: not a CGE).
THE MODEL (2/3)

... with an overlapping generations framework (OLG) (60 cohorts)

\[
U_{t,0}^* = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \sum_{j=0}^{\psi_{t,0}} \left[ \frac{1}{(1+\rho)^j} \left( \left( c_{t+j,j}^* \right)^{1-1/\xi} + \kappa \left( H_j \left( 1 - \ell_{t+j,j}^* \right) \right)^{1-1/\xi} \right)^{\frac{1}{\xi-1/\xi}} \right]^{1-\sigma}
\]

Constraint:

\[
\ell_{t,0}^* \omega_{t,0} + \sum_{j=1}^{\psi_{t,0}} \ell_{t+j,j}^* \omega_{t+j,j} \prod_{i=1}^j \left( \frac{1}{1+r_{t+i}} \right) = c_{t,0}^* + \sum_{j=1}^{\psi_{t,0}} \ell_{t+j,j}^* \omega_{t+j,j} \prod_{i=1}^j \left( \frac{1}{1+r_{t+i}} \right)
\]

CPO (Euler equation):

\[
\frac{c_{t,a}^*}{c_{t-1,a-1}^*} = \left( \frac{1+r_t}{1+\rho} \right)^{\kappa} \left( \frac{1+\kappa \xi \omega_{t,0}^{1-\xi}}{1+\kappa \xi \omega_{t-1,a-1}^{1-\xi}} \right)^{\frac{\kappa-\xi}{\xi-1}}
\]

... and public finances:

- Public spending (pensions; non ageing-related public expenditures...)
- Social contributions, income tax, carbon tax
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APPLICATION 1: THE SECOND DIVIDEND AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE (1/5)

- Intuition:
  - The demographic structure influences macroeconomic activity.
  - The "second dividend" modifies growth (environmental taxes may lessen the distortive effects of the tax system if they are substituted to income taxes or proportional social contributions. Recycling a carbon tax through lower taxes on labor income could trigger a higher effect on activity than through higher spending; for a survey: see Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002).
  - Thus, in general equilibrium, the second dividend and the demographic structure should be interrelated.

APPLICATION 1: THE SECOND DIVIDEND AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE (2/5)

• Policy scenarios...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carbon tax redistributed through…</th>
<th>… higher lump-sum public expenditures</th>
<th>… lower proportional, direct income taxes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Scenario DEU EXP</td>
<td>Scenario DEU TAX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Scenario FRA EXP</td>
<td>Scenario FRA TAX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• … parameterized on two different demographic structures (e.g., France and Germany).

In line with life-cycle theory, the cohorts aged 40-65 save more than other demographic groups in the model. + they are on average more productive than the young active cohorts.
APPLICATION 1: THE SECOND DIVIDEND AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE (3/5)

The second dividend is higher in the model for relatively older countries than for relatively younger ones, and the difference mirrors mainly the influence of demographic factors.

- Intuition: the more concentrated the demographic structure on cohorts with a high saving rate, the higher the effect on capital supply of recycling a carbon tax through lower proportional taxes on income, the higher the positive influence on long-run GDP of the second dividend.

- For a carbon tax of around 1% of GDP that is fully recycled, positive effect between +0.1% and +0.5% of GDP in the long run, depending on whether the recycling concentrates on working population or not.
APPLICATION 1: THE SECOND DIVIDEND AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE (4/5)

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} dividend has pro-youth intergenerational redistributive properties. Joint influence of a distortive effect and a capital deepening effect:

- The former \textit{bolsters} relatively more the wellbeing of the young cohorts.

- The latter \textit{weighs} relatively more on the wellbeing of the aged working cohorts (through a lower yield for savings)

- This holds qualitatively whether the recycling of the carbon tax concentrates on the working population or not (i.e., recycled for the whole population).
APPLICATION 1: THE SECOND DIVIDEND AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE (5/5)

The magnitude of the intergenerational pro-youth property of the second dividend is influenced by demographics.

It is higher in a relatively older country than in a younger one.

*(graph shows intertemporal welfare for each cohort depending on its birth year)*
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (1/8)

Policy scenarios:

• **Scenario A** is the baseline, **no-reform** scenario. No centrally implemented rise in public targets for renewables in the mix, no carbon tax in the future.

• **Scenario B** adds to scenario A a centrally implemented rise in the fraction of **renewables** in the energy mix (financed by a specific feed-in tariff).
  
  ... so that it achieves a reduction in carbon emissions of x% in 2050 as compared to 2009 (i.e., the year preceding the public announcement of the reform in 2010).

• **Scenario C** adds to scenario A one **recycled carbon tax** created in 2015 and increasing by 5% in real terms per year afterwards.
  
  ... so that it achieves a reduction in carbon emissions of x% in 2050 as compared to 2009.

  The income associated with the carbon tax is recycled through lower proportional taxes on households’ gross income.

  **No centralised policy in favour of renewables in scenario C.**
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (2/8)

Higher quantitative targets set by public authorities for the future development of renewables...

• ... weigh on growth in the long run in the model. Intuition: it fosters energy prices for private agents, forcing them to buy at a higher price (at least in the short-medium run) a good necessary for production with no perfect substitute.

While lessening the demand for energy in the model, the rise of renewables in the mix triggers some capital deepening: higher energy prices weigh on disposable income: life-cycle behavior imply a rise in the saving rate, with an upward effect on the supply of K.

• ... weigh on the intertemporal (material) welfare of all cohorts - however, the detrimental effect is less pronounced for currently older generations.

Permanent income effect: the younger a cohort today, the longer it will bear the cost of increasing energy prices associated with more renewables in the mix, ceteris paribus. And vice-versa.
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (3/8)

A carbon tax (fully recycled through lower taxes on income) displays pro-youth intergenerational effects and is more detrimental to currently relatively aged working cohorts and current retirees.

- Recycling a carbon tax through a lower proportional tax on income amounts, in absolute terms, to distributing relatively more revenues to cohorts receiving higher income (i.e., currently aged and working cohorts, more productive).

- The net effect of the recycled carbon tax is positive for the current income of aged working cohorts at any year in the model, but negative for the current income of young and retired cohorts.

- The influence on the permanent income of a recycled carbon tax is negative for the cohorts which are retired or aged but still active when the tax is implemented, and positive for the permanent income of future generations.

The influence on the intertemporal welfare of currently young active cohorts stems from the joint effects of a rising rate of the fully recycled tax, its associated downward effect on the rate of the proportional income tax, its influence on income depending on the age of the cohort, and the interrelations of all these influences in the general equilibrium.
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (4/8)

FOR THE SAME LEVEL OF CO2 EMISSIONS

![Graph showing the comparison between Scenario B and Scenario C for different years of birth for the same level of CO2 emissions.](image)
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (5/8)

Curves of iso-reduction of carbon emissions in the model
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (6/8)

Different types of social preferences used in the model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social aversion to intergenerational inequality</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social planner takes account of the welfare of future generations</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social planner does not take account of the welfare of future generations</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (7/8)

Optimal mix of instruments for a social planner aiming to lessen carbon emissions, depending on its social preferences
APPLICATION 2: FOSTERING RENEWABLES VS RECYCLING A CARBON TAX (8/8)

While a carbon tax triggers better effects on growth than developing renewables for a given target of reduction of CO2 emissions, it does not necessarily maximise the social welfare because it raises about intergenerational redistributive effects:

- The policy chosen depends from social preferences as concerns intergenerational inequality and the wellbeing of future generations.
- Governments can decide to implement regulations increasing the fraction of renewables in the energy mix along with the creation of a fully recycled carbon tax.

Incidentally, our model also suggests that a mix of a carbon tax and a centralized policy favoring renewables may not be enough to meet targets of carbon emissions diminution as high as 70%/80% in 2050, as often advocated for in the public debate (this is in line with Henriet, Maggiar and Schubert, 2014).
APPLICATION 3: EFFECTS OF ENERGY POLICIES IN OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES (THE SAXUM MODEL) (1/4)

• Designed for oil producing countries (here, Saudi Arabia/GCC) which...
  o have relatively low energy efficiency
  o implement regulated/subsidized prices of energy
  o benefit from massive public incomes from oil exports
  o have rapidly growing native populations
  o have a high proportion of expatriates
  o have low taxes
  o need more public investments so as to foster economic development.

• New, adapted structure of the model (see next slide)
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Private non-oil sector: two-levels CES function with elasticity of substitution

Capital / Energy

Non-oil Labor supply (with L-augmenting LFP)

Public stock of K

Public non-Oil demand of capital / unit of eff. labor

Private non-Oil Capital demand

- Energy expenditures

- Proportional tax on wages

* Ageing-related public expenditures (pensions) rising in the very long-run

Net annual income of each cohort

Intertemporal utility maximization

Consumption/savings and leisure / working time of each cohort

Private, non-oil saudi supply of capital per unit of eff. labor (after numerical convergence)

Saudi GNP (after numerical convergence)

Production function with a CES nested structure

Future energy mix (if price responsive)

Demand in future year \(n\) of energy (minus renewables, if any)

Demand in future year \(n\) of electricity

Demand in future year \(n\) of oil

Demand in future year \(n\) of non electric energy

Demand in future year \(n\) of natural gas

Real weighted end-use prices of...

Oil products (diesel fuel, light fuel oil, gasoline)

Natural gas (household & industry if applicable)

Electricity (households & industry)

Regulated end-use price of automotive diesel fuel, light fuel oil, gasoline, nat gas for households, nat gas for industry. (no taxes)

Regulated end-use price of electricity (no taxes)

Transport, distrib / refining costs

Cost of production of oil, oil, others (past and future): for each technology, fuel costs, efficiency of the turbine, operational costs, overnight investment, cost of capital, lifetime, utilisation rate.

Cost of production of natural gas, oil, others (past and future): for each technology, fuel costs, efficiency of the turbine, operational costs, overnight investment, cost of capital, lifetime, utilisation rate.

Oil revenues (income from crude oil exports)

Public current expenditures

Public capital expenditures

Price of oil on world markets

KSA exports of crude oil (volume)

National consumption of crude oil (for elec or not)

National production of crude oil (b/d)

Demand in future year \(n\) of oil

Demand in future year \(n\) of natural gas

Demand in future year \(n\) of electricity

Energy efficiency index

Total national energy demand (volume)

Past consumption of oil products

Past consumption nat gas

Past consumption of electricity

Energy prices

Regulated end-use price of...
APPLICATION 3: EFFECTS OF ENERGY POLICIES IN OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES (THE SAXUM MODEL) (3/4)

• Higher energy efficiency acts on aggregate energy productivity through two main channels in GCC countries:
  o a direct impact of energy efficiency results (lower energy consumption for a given level of output + higher levels of activity and greater energy consumption (rebound effect).
  o impact on the fiscal balance of Saudi Arabia due to increased oil revenue from selling otherwise domestically consumed oil onto the export market.

• Two alternative scenarios are considered as concerns the way revenue from additional oil exports is used:
  o Scenario B: using the EE fiscal dividend to reinvest into expanding the public capital stock (-> infrastructures).
  o Scenario C: using the EE fiscal dividend to reinvest into expanding current (non-capital) public spending.
APPLICATION 3: EFFECTS OF ENERGY POLICIES IN OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES (THE SAXUM MODEL) (4/4)

(work in progress in November 2015)

Future EE gains of +4%/y up to 2050 (instead of 0% as in the past) could foster Saudi GNP by +0.3%/+0.5% per year over next 5 decades:

• Recycling EE gains through public transfers could trigger a sizeable impact on growth (+0.5% per year on average up to 2050) but with some significant drawbacks: effect vanishes as soon as EE gains disappear + private agents' income depends increasingly from public finances and thus on oil income -- increasing concern for the macroeconomic stability of KSA.

• Recycling EE gains through a rise in the stock of public K would have a positive macroeconomic effects, building up progressively (+0.3% per year on average up to 2050, still more afterwards) but with some significant advantages: the positive influence remains as long as infrastructures are used and thus keeps materializing even if energy efficiency gains disappear + income of private agents does not depend strongly on public transfers and oil income, strengthening the macroeconomic stability + policy more favorable to future generations who might face a deteriorated economic context.
CONCLUSION

• Intergenerational redistributive effects and demographic structures can play a significant role in energy & environmental economics and policies.

• OLG frameworks enshrined in EG modeling are well adapted for studying such issues.

THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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