“When things go wrong: do US gas regional prices move in the aftermath of pipeline incidents?”

By Anna Creti (Paris Dauphine)

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WORK IN PROGRESS

Chaire d’Economie du Gaz Naturel
Outline

• Introduction: the US gas network
• Pipeline incidents: the context
• Data, methodology, first results
  ▫ incidents, safety, gas regional prices: is there a link? What can we learn from that link?
• Ongoing work
The US Gas Network

- The U.S. natural gas pipeline network is a highly integrated transmission and distribution grid that can transport natural gas to and from nearly any location in the lower 48 States. The natural gas pipeline grid comprises more than 210 natural gas pipeline systems.
  
- 305,000 miles of interstate and intrastate transmission pipelines
  
- More than 1,400 compressor stations
  
- More than 11,000 delivery points, 5,000 receipt points, and 1,400 interconnection points
  
- 24 hubs or market centers
  
- 400 underground natural gas storage facilities
  
- 49 locations where natural gas can be imported/exported via pipelines
  
- 8 LNG (liquefied natural gas) import facilities and 100 LNG peaking facilities

IEA 2017
Pipeline incident: the context

Complex regulation

Pipeline Operators
- Safely operating & maintaining
- Expanding system to meet needs
- Recognizing & managing risks

Safety Regulators
- Establish safety standards
- Inspect & enforce compliance
- Recognize & address risks (communication, change standards, conduct R&D)
- Advocate statutory changes

Local and State Government
- Establish land use restrictions
- Promote effective rate regulation
- Provide emergency management services

Federal Government Agencies
- Evaluate incident causes
- Communicate implications of incidents
- Permit pipelines on federal lands
- Evaluate security
- Evaluate proposed regulations

Assuring Pipeline Safety: Stakeholder Roles

Operators & Trade Associations
- Recognize safety issues
- Organize members to determine how best to resolve safety issues
- Communicate safety perspective
- Assemble & evaluate safety performance data

Rate Regulators
- Evaluate rate proposals
- Evaluate & approve innovative cost recovery processes to address serious risks
- Balance safety, reliability and cost

The Public
- Call 811 before digging
- Call 911 in case of gas leak or emergency
- Evacuate building if necessary
- Advocate in safety rate cases
- Understanding and mitigating the risks

Representatives of the Public Interest
- Provide forum for responsible debate
- Communicate with stakeholders
- Advocate statutory changes
- Assemble & communicate best practices
- Service the public
Pipelines are safe but incidents occur

The San Bruno pipeline explosion occurred at 6:11 pm PDT on September 9, 2010, in San Bruno, California, a suburb of San Francisco, when a 30-inch (76 cm) diameter steel natural gas pipeline owned by Pacific Gas & Electric exploded into flames in the Crestmoor residential neighborhood 2 mi (3.2 km) west of San Francisco International Airport near Skyline Boulevard and San Bruno Avenue.

The United States Geological Survey registered the explosion and resulting shock wave as a magnitude 1.1 earthquake.

It took crews nearly an hour to determine it was a gas pipeline explosion.

Eyewitnesses reported the initial blast "had a wall of fire more than 1,000 feet high" Breaking News, September 10, 2010

Research Question

Which is the impact of incidents regional gas prices?

**Answer: from safety to security of supply**

If in the aftermath of the incidents price are affected, then there is no immediate gas flow substitution from adjacent markets: gas vulnerability

The reverse would mean that security of supply by inter/intraregional gas flows is guaranteed

Novel study in the litterature
Literature Review (I)

• Based on the efficient market approach study the impact of incidents on equity value...
  ▫ Capelle-Blancard & Laguna, 2010. JEEM
    • Stock market reaction to industrial disasters: 64 explosions in chemical plants and refineries worldwide in 1990-2005 belonging to 38 firms
    • Petrochemical: drop in their market value of 1.3% over 2 days immediately following the disaster.
  
  ▫ Borenstein & Zimmerman, 1998. AER
    • Stock market reaction to airplane incidents.
Literature Review (II)

• Technical literature
  ▫ Restepo et al. 2009. *Int J Of Critical Infrastructure Protection*
    • Data on 1582 incidents related to hazardous liquid pipelines for the period 2002–2005 are analyzed.
    • Logistic regression to determine factors associated with nonzero product loss cost, property damage cost and cleanup and recovery costs.
    • Results used to construct illustrative scenarios for hazardous liquid pipeline incidents.

    • In addition to enjoying a substantial cost advantage, pipelines result in fewer spillage incidents and personal injuries than road and rail.
Illustration of the model: NY, CA and Texas

- Different profiles in terms of consumption, production, export and storage
  - Texas: big exporter
  - NY: big consumer
  - CA balanced profile between consumption and production, still with a moderate import volume
Illustration of the model: NY, CA and Texas, consumption

Natural Gas Consumption by End Use

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Illustration of the model: NY, CA and Texas production

Number of Producing Gas Wells

Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Databases

• From January 1st., 1996 to August 31st 2012

1. All gas pipeline incidents (2421 observations) and their characteristics

2. Merged with a database of weekly price of gas in 18 Hubs in the U.S. (and Canada) over the same period:
   ▫ For this presentation we consider Los Angeles City Gate, New York City Gate and Katy Hub, with the Henry Hub used as counterfactual
1. Incidents Data

Summary statistics: N, max, min, mean, sd
by categories of: state_id (state_id)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>state_id</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>fatal</th>
<th>injuries</th>
<th>old</th>
<th>veryold</th>
<th>young</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>3.77e+08</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2812854</td>
<td>.1052632</td>
<td>.6052632</td>
<td>.3223684</td>
<td>.2171053</td>
<td>.4605263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>3.06e+07</td>
<td>.6823983</td>
<td>4.159339</td>
<td>.4689282</td>
<td>.4136378</td>
<td>.500871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| New York | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Max | 1.30e+07 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Min | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mean | 610493.5 | .25 | .85 | .2 | .4333333 | .3666667 |
| SD | 1723960 | .8949008 | 1.830301 | .4033756 | .4997174 | .4859611 |

| Texas | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Max | 1.03e+08 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Min | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mean | 875859.7 | .0866667 | .3733333 | .4233333 | .1966667 | .38 |
| SD | 6251384 | .3258466 | .8344183 | .4949128 | .3981423 | .4861974 |

| Total | 2421 | 2421 | 2421 | 2421 | 2421 | 2421 |
| Max | 5.47e+08 | 33 | 51 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Min | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mean | 1002875 | .1148286 | .4365964 | .354399 | .2230483 | .4225527 |
| SD | 1.39e+07 | .829736 | 1.62057 | .4784296 | .4163765 | .4940675 |

½ of Texas # of incidents but huge damage.

Fewer incidents

Only 38% of recent pipelines

Few human losses.
Damage can be high but on average 1M US$
1. Hubs relevant market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HUB</th>
<th>US ZONE</th>
<th>STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECO-C Hub</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Alberta, Canada (Montana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingsgate, BC</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles City Gate</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malin, Oregon</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumas, Washington</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>British Columbia, Canada (Washington, Idaho &amp; Montana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katy Hub</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan Basin</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Utah, Arizona, Colorado &amp; New Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topock, Arizona</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waha Hub</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta City Gate</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia Pool</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City Gate</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niagara Falls, Ontario</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>Ontario, Canada (Minessota, New York, Ohio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago City Gate</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerson, Manitoba</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>North Dakota &amp; Minessota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventura, Iowa</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opal, Wyoming</td>
<td>CENTRAL</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhandle Field Zone</td>
<td>CENTRAL</td>
<td>Kansas, Oklahoma &amp; Texas portions of PEPL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- An incident in Texas may impact three Hubs (same with all states in color).
- Canadian Hubs considered as affected by incidents in US neighboring state
- Neighboring states can also be considered: crucial to define relevant market
2. Incidents Data (II)

For each incident we also identify:

- the type of pipeline (transmission or distribution),
- the cause (miscellaneous, excavation, malfunctioning, etc) and
- the operator involved.
Prices

- Differences in movements among Hub prices
Methodology

- Event study under the market model approach:

1. Using a window of 3 weeks prior to each incident (precisely [-4,-1]) we estimate the expected return at each hub as a constant plus a slope times Henry Hub return.

2. We calculate the abnormal returns (AR) as the difference between actual returns and the returns calculated in 1 for an estimation window of 2 weeks following the incident [0,+1].
   - To perform this exercise the data of the incident is placed in the Sunday following the incident to make it coincide with the weekly price data.

3. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).
   - The abnormal returns can be interpreted as resulting gains or losses in the regional price due to the change in market conditions (e.g. scarcity)
   - They may underline security of supply problems.

\[
R_{it} = a_i + b_i R_{mt} + e_{it}
\]
\[
AR_{it} = Ri - a_i + b_i R_{mt}
\]
Main results

• 1/3 of incidents significantly explain divergences between Regional Hub’s price and Henry Hub price.

• Incidents with high estimated damage in US$ or high number of fatalities do not always significantly explain abnormal returns.
Significative event dates in green
Damage for each event in US$/1000 in red
### Zoom on the top 10 significative incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Operator Id</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/07/03</td>
<td>Southern California Gas Co</td>
<td>3010000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/07/05</td>
<td>Southern California Gas Co</td>
<td>2350000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/07/12</td>
<td>El Paso Natural Gas Co</td>
<td>1530000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/24/01</td>
<td>Southern California Gas Co</td>
<td>1240000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/04/02</td>
<td>Southern California Gas Co</td>
<td>1220000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/19/02</td>
<td>Southern California Gas Co</td>
<td>1220000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/30/96</td>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric Co</td>
<td>678000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/04</td>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric Co</td>
<td>610000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/12/04</td>
<td>Southern California Gas Co</td>
<td>595000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/22/07</td>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric Co</td>
<td>543000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Top 10 significative incidents classified with respect to damage (see the arrow for the most important one)

- Some incidents have occurred with a higher damage but are not significative

Another result that suggests a security of supply problem
Incidents with huge damage may not impact on prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>state_id</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Hub</th>
<th>operator_id</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>fatalities</th>
<th>CAR</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>09/09/10</td>
<td>Los Angeles City Gate</td>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric Co</td>
<td>377000000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Significative event dates in green
Damage for each event in US$/1000 in red
Significative event dates in green
Damage for each event in US$/1000 in red
Ongoing work

1) Proper definition of relevant market - a proper identification strategy: two unrelated state prices may become related due to an incident

2) Event study with rolling windows: incidents effect may overlap

3) Multivariate regressions to relate cross-sectional differences in the loss incurred to the incidents features such as:
   - Local market conditions
   - Regional and time (and seasonal) dummies that may explain why some incidents are non-significant
   - Dummy equal to 1 if there is an explosion
   - Total number of fatalities and injured (human damage)
   - Dummy to account for security regulatory changes (so far year 2000 identified).

\[ SL_{i,[0,+t]} = CAR_{i,[0,+t]} MV_i, \]
Concluding Remarks

- Pipelines are the safest way to transport gas but incidents occur in any case causing changes in regional prices.
  - The heterogeneity of such incidents implies that some may have no impact and the reasons for such a difference is explored in this paper for the first time: USA has a strong interconnection network but seems to be unable to smooth incidents effects on local markets.
  - Lessons can be learnt from exploring the reasons of this vulnerability behind safety regulation.
“When things go wrong: do US gas regional prices move in the aftermath of pipeline incidents?”

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THANK YOU!
U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports by State

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
PHMSA (The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration):

- issues pipeline safety regulations addressing construction, operation and maintenance
- inspects pipeline operators, and enforces against violations of pipeline safety laws and regulations.
- regulates interstate and intrastate hazardous liquids transmission pipelines, except that approves some state agencies to exercise interstate inspection authority and/or intrastate inspection and enforcement authority.
- regulates gathering pipelines greater than 6 5/8” diameter in all “non-rural” areas and rural areas within a quarter-mile of an “unusually sensitive area” and operating above a certain pressure.
  - Unusually sensitive areas are determined and include drinking water sources and ecological resources unusually sensitive to environmental damage from a liquids release.
  - Other gathering lines can be regulated by states or the Interior Department.

States may issue regulations over intrastate pipelines if they are consistent with federal regulations. These state pipeline safety agencies are usually members of the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates some pipeline incidents and issues reports and recommendations to regulators, companies, and industry groups.
PHMSA (The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration)

States may issue regulations over intrastate pipelines if they are consistent with federal regulations. These state pipeline safety agencies are usually members of the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates some pipeline incidents and issues reports and recommendations to regulators, companies, and industry groups.
Quick overview HH price

Many Ups and downs in our reference price (and returns)

Price in US$ per MMBtu
Return
We observe some regions with very different patterns from HH. Probably due to demand (see NY whole sample and LA before 2001): mean.

Prices in US$ per MMBtu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>operator_id</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>fatalities</th>
<th>CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/12/04</td>
<td>Central Hudson Gas &amp; Electric Corp</td>
<td>2390000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/07/08</td>
<td>Consolidated Edison Co Of New York</td>
<td>1310000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/28/08</td>
<td>Consolidated Edison Co Of New York</td>
<td>1050000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,38</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/27/09</td>
<td>Consolidated Edison Co Of New York</td>
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<td>11/13/06</td>
<td>Keyspan Energy Delivery Long Island</td>
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<td>6,48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Gas Pipeline Co Of America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>09/01/08(Kmi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/14/10</td>
<td>Enterprise Products Operating Llc</td>
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<td>1030000</td>
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