UNLOCKING NATURAL GAS PIPELINE DEPLOYMENT IN A LDC

A note on rate-of-return regulation

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**BACKGROUND: Mozambique’s Gas Bonanza**

- **One of the poorest nations** (W. Bank, 2015)
  - 2015 GDP/cap: $525.0
  - 2015 HDI ranking: 180 (out of 188 countries)
  - 2012 Electrification rate: 20.2%

- **2010: prolific gas discoveries in the North**
  - Reserves (Rovuma Basin): 3,700 Bcm (i.e., 2.5 x Troll in Norway)

- **The IOCs**
  - Favor large scale, export-oriented, LNG projects
  - Overlook the domestic market

- **The Government of Mozambique**
  - Obtains a share of the volumes extracted (PSA)
    - Mega-project developers have applied to GoM for gas supply (e.g.: fertilizers, methanol, aluminum)
  - Ambitions the deployment of a national pipeline system

- **A proposal by the World Bank (2012)**
  - A phased pipeline development
  - Gas-Based Industries (GBI) can provide the “anchor” load needed for pipeline development
BUILDING AHEAD OF DEMAND?

So, the GoM has to attract FDI in a gas pipeline system

Joskow (1999): simple regulatory instruments should be favored to attract FDI in the infrastructure sectors of developing economies.

⇒ Mozambique has implemented a simple form of rate of return regulation

But: foreign investors are reluctant to consider the potential of the domestic market
⇒ Investors solely consider the proven demand of large X-oriented gas-based industries

Chenery (1952), Manne (1961): « build ahead of demand »

In case of investment irreversibility and pronounced economies of scale, it is justified to install ex ante an appropriate degree of overcapacity to minimize the expected cost of production over time if the future output trajectory is expected to rise over time.

Can planners/regulators leverage on the A-J effect to adequately build “ahead of demand”?
RESEARCH QUESTIONS

How should the allowed rate of return be determined?
- to attract investment
- to achieve the installation of an "adequate" degree of overcapacity

ROADMAP

1 – Technology, an engineering economics approach
2 – Examine and characterize the *ex ante* behavior of the regulated firm
3 – Characterize the *ex post* behavior of the regulated firm in case of an *ex-post* expansion of the demand
1: TECHNOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY: AN APPROXIMATION

1 - Compressor equation

\[ H = c_1 \left[ \left( \frac{p_0 + \Delta p}{p_0} \right)^b - 1 \right] \]

\[ Q \approx c_1 b \frac{\Delta p}{p_0} Q \]

2 - A flow equation (Weymouth)

\[ Q = \frac{c_2 p_0}{\sqrt{L}} D^{8/3} \sqrt{\left( \frac{p_0 + \Delta p}{p_0} \right)^2 - 1} \approx \frac{c_2 p_0 \sqrt{2}}{\sqrt{L}} D^{8/3} \frac{\Delta p}{p_0} \]

\[ Q = \sqrt[3]{\frac{2(c_2 p_0)^2}{c_1 b L}} D^{16/9} H^{1/3} \]
**Further Assumptions**

**H1:** The amount of energy $E$ used for the compression is proportional to $H$

**H2:** The capital expenditures $K$ is proportional to the weight of steel (i.e., to the volume of an open cylinder)

$$K = P_s L \pi \left[ \left( \frac{D}{2} + \tau \right)^2 - \frac{D^2}{4} \right] W_s$$

So, using the mechanical stability condition:

$$K = P_s L \pi D^2 \left[ c_3 + c_3^2 \right] W_s$$

We obtain the Cobb-Douglas production function $Q = M K^{8/9} E^{1/3}$

$$Q^\beta = K^\alpha E^{1-\alpha} \quad \text{with} \quad \alpha = \frac{8}{11} \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = \frac{9}{11}$$
THE COST FUNCTION

**Long-run**

\[
\min_{K,E} C(Q) = rK + eE
\]

subject to

\[
Q^\beta = K^\alpha E^{1-\alpha}
\]

**Long-run cost function**

\[
C(Q) = \frac{r^\alpha e^{1-\alpha}}{\alpha^\alpha (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha}} Q^\beta
\]

with \( \beta = 9/11 \)

**LR cost-minimizing capital**

\[
K(Q) = \left(\frac{e\alpha}{r(1-\alpha)}\right)^{1-\alpha} Q^\beta
\]

**Short-run**

\( K \) is fixed

\( E \) is variable

\[
E(Q,K) = K^{1-\alpha} Q^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}}
\]

**Short-run cost function**

\[
SRTC_K(Q) = rK + eK^{\frac{-\alpha}{1-\alpha}} Q^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}}
\]
2: The *Ex Ante* behavior of the regulated firm
We assume a constant elasticity demand schedule

\[ P(Q) = A Q^{-\varepsilon} \quad \text{with} \quad \varepsilon \in (1 - \beta, 1) \]

and examine the behavior of the regulated monopoly

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{k,q} & \quad \Pi(Q) = P(Q)Q - rK - eE(Q,K) \\
\text{s.t} & \quad P(Q)Q - eE(Q,K) = sK
\end{align*}
\]

Solution: see Klevorick (1971).
We compare the solution (*) with two benchmarks:

(M) Monopoly

(a) Average cost pricing

Comparing metrics: output, capital, and cost ratios

\[ \frac{Q^*}{Q^M} \] \quad \frac{K^*}{K(Q^*)} \quad \frac{C^*}{C(Q^*)} \\
\text{gradient wrt } s/r \quad <0 \quad <0 \quad <0

These ratios are determined by: the ratio \( s/r \), the demand elasticity and the technology parameters.
3: The case of an ex-post expansion of the demand
**The ex-post behavior of the regulated firm**

- **Ex ante:**
  The regulator sets $s$ that will remain fixed hereafter.
  The regulated firm decides its investment and thus $K^*$.

- **Ex post:**
  A larger demand: $P(Q) = (1 + \lambda)P(Q)$ with $\lambda > 0$.

**Lemma:** The regulated firm must adjust its output, and there are exactly two candidates: $Q_c^* < Q^* < Q_e^*$.

We focus on the case of the expanded output $Q_e^*$.

This output is monotonically increasing with $\lambda$. 

\[ P(Q)Q - eE(Q, K^*) \]
We now consider a cost-efficient capital-output combination \((K_{ce}, Q_{ce})\) ...

\[ K_{ce} = K(Q_{ce}) \]

where \( K(Q) \) is the LR cost minimizing capital

... that also verifies the \textbf{ex post} rate-of-return constraint:

\[
(1 + \lambda) P(Q_{ce}) Q_{ce} - eE(Q_{ce}, K_{ce}) = sK_{ce}
\]

Solving, we obtain a closed form expression of \((K_{ce}, Q_{ce})\)
Can we set \( s \) so that the *ex post* capital-output combination is cost efficient?

**Proposition:** For any \( \lambda \in (0, \bar{\lambda}) \) with 
\[
\bar{\lambda} = \left[ \frac{\beta - (1-\epsilon)(1-\alpha)}{(1-\epsilon)\alpha} \right]^{\eta} \left[ \frac{1-\epsilon}{\beta} \right]^{-1}
\]
there exists a unique rate of return \( s_\lambda \in (r, s^M) \) such that: \( K^* = K(Q^*_e) \)
3: P O L I C Y D I S C U S S I O N
THE EX ANTE SOCIALLY DESIRABLE $s$

Max $s$ 

$$W(s) = \int_0^Q P(q) dq - rK - eE(Q,K)$$

s.t. 

Max $K,Q$

$$\Pi(Q) = P(Q)Q - rK - eE(Q,K)$$

s.t. 

$$P(Q)Q - eE(Q,K) = sK$$

$$K \geq 0 , \; Q \geq 0.$$

Solution: 

$$s^{opt} = \frac{[\beta - (1-\varepsilon)(1-\alpha)]^2 r}{\alpha[\beta - (1-\alpha)(1-\varepsilon)^2]}$$

iff 

$$r < s^{opt}$$

$s^{opt}$ is monot. decreasing with $(1/\varepsilon)$

and $s^{opt} > r$ iff 

$$\frac{1}{\varepsilon} < \frac{11}{2 + 4\sqrt{3}} \approx 1.23$$

As $\varepsilon < 1$, $s^{opt}$ is bounded:

$$\frac{s^{opt}}{r} < \frac{\beta}{\alpha} = 1.125$$
APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION

This table details the range of $\lambda$ for which it is possible to: (i) build ahead of demand while (ii) maintaining a fair rate of return $s$ lower than the threshold $\beta r/\alpha$.

For $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}$, one has to follow Joskow (1999) who points that regulators in developing economies often face possibly conflicting public policy goals and have to clearly define and prioritize these goals.
CONCLUSIONS

- The technology of a natural gas pipeline can be approximated by a Cobb-Douglas production function that has two inputs \( K \) and \( E \).

   Discussion: relevance of the empirical analyses of the A-J effect that solely consider the relations between \( K \) and \( L \)?

- Case \( \lambda = 0 \): It can be justified to use a fair rate of return \( s \) larger than \( r \) the market price of capital in the gas pipeline industry.

   Note: welfare maximization suggests that the ratio \( s/r \) has to be lower than \( \beta/\alpha = 1.125 \)

- Case \( \lambda > 0 \): It is possible to use the A-J effect to “build ahead of demand”

   Note: the range of \( \lambda \) for which this strategy does not hamper the welfare obtained ex ante is quite narrow.