
Impact of renewables on electricity markets – Do support schemes matter?

Jenny Winkler, Paris 13/10/2016

Agenda

- Introduction
- Support systems for renewables and electricity markets
- Influence of renewables on electricity markets
- Methodology
- Results
- Conclusion and policy recommendations

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Introduction

- Renewable shares are rising globally
- Rising renewable shares influence electricity markets
- Different support schemes for renewables lead to different behaviour of renewables on electricity markets

→ Research question:

In how far does the chosen support scheme influence the impact of renewables on electricity markets?

→ The paper does however not provide a full assessment of support schemes for renewables

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Support schemes for renewables

| Support scheme | Feed-in tariff | Sliding feed-in premium | Feed-in premium with cap and floor | Fixed feed-in premium | Quota-based support scheme | Capacity-based support scheme |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| Income | Constant payment per unit of electricity | Electricity price plus premium adapting to the market price | Electricity price plus premium, total income between cap and floor price | Electricity price plus fixed premium | Electricity price plus certificate price | Electricity price plus generation independent capacity premium |
| Advantages | Low risk for plant operators and low capital costs | Low risk for plant operators and low capital costs, reaction to short term market signals | Low risk for plant operators and low capital costs, reaction to short term market signals | Expected reaction to long term and short term price signals | Competitive determination of support | Undistorted market participation |
| Drawbacks | Risk of over or under compensation, no reaction to prices | Limited reaction to market signals, relatively high complexity | Limited reaction to market signals, relatively high complexity | High risk for plant operators unless fixed premium covers big share of income | High risk for plant operators due to double marketing | High risk for perverse incentives regarding plant design |
| Reaction to long term market signals | None | Very limited | Limited (depending on spread between cap and floor) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Reaction to short term market signals | No direct marketing | Support payments (or certificate prices) as opportunity costs for generation reduction | | | | Undistorted market participation |

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| Income | Constant payment per unit of electricity | Electricity price plus premium adapting to the market price, | Electricity price plus premium, total income between cap and floor price | Electricity price plus fixed premium | Electricity price plus certificate price | Electricity price plus generation independent capacity premium |
| Advantages | Low risk for plant operators and low capital costs | Can be auctioned! (no difference regarding market participation) | | | Competitive determination of support | Undistorted market participation |
| Drawbacks | Risk of over or under compensation, no reaction to prices | | | | High risk for plant operators due to double marketing | High risk for perverse incentives regarding plant design |
| Reaction to long term market signals | None | Very limited | Limited (depending on spread between cap and floor) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| Advantages | Low risk for plant operators and low capital costs | Compared in this study regarding the impact of renewables on electricity markets | | | No reaction term and premium price | Competitive determination of support | Undistorted market participation |
| Drawbacks | Risk of over or under compensation, no reaction to prices | | | | relatively high complexity | relatively high complexity | No reaction for plant operators unless fixed premium covers big share of income |
| Reaction to long term market signals | None | Very limited | Limited (depending on spread between cap and floor) | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
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Influence of renewables on electricity markets – The merit-order effect

- Renewables have low variable costs or reduce demand (residual load)
- As a consequence, less conventional plant is needed to fulfill demand in hours with generation from renewables
- Thus, electricity prices are lower in these hours and average electricity prices decrease when renewable shares are rising

Influence of renewables on electricity markets – The merit-order effect




Fig. 1. Merit-order effect under different support schemes for a situation with low demand and high renewable generation.

Influence of renewables on electricity markets – Price volatility

- Residual load more volatile than demand
- Therefore, typically higher price volatility at higher renewable shares
 - Unless feed-in profile is well correlated to demand
- Also: number of hours with negative prices increases with higher renewable shares

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Methodology – Model set-up

- Plant mix and must-run capacities (as proxies for system flexibility) important parameters for effects of renewables on electricity markets
- Conventional capacity mix determined using optimization model
- Market prices and influence of renewables determined using simulation model
- Bidding behaviour of renewables:
 - Original bidding behaviour under FIT: $p_{\text{GOT}} = p_{\text{MIN}} + 1$
 - Optimized bidding behaviour under FIT: $p_{\text{FIT}} = -\text{FIT}$
 - Bidding behaviour under FIP: $p_{\text{FIP}} = -(\text{FIT} - \text{Forecasted monthly average market price} \cdot \text{technology specific relative market value}) + \text{marginal generation costs}$
 - Bidding behaviour under CAP: $p_{\text{OM}} = \text{marginal generation costs}$

Methodology – Scenarios

- Plant mix and must-run capacities (as proxies for system flexibility) important side parameters for effects of renewables on electricity markets

| Scenario Group | Reference (RS) | Reference – sensitivity (RSa) | Alternative 1 (AS1) | Alternative 2 (AS2) |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| Renewables | Exogenous | Exogenous | Exogenous | Exogenous |
| Conventionals | Optimized | Optimized | Optimized, only gas-fired power plants allowed | Optimized |
| Existing capacities considered in the optimization | Renewables: Yes Conventionals: Yes | Renewables: Yes Conventionals: Yes | Renewables: Yes Conventionals: No | Renewables: No Conventionals: Yes |
| Must-run requirements | Reserve market plants 2020: 7760 MW 2030: 8947 MW | None | None | Reserve market plants: 20952 MW |

- RS and Rsa modelled for 2020 and 2030, alternatives for 2030 only
- 24 model runs (4 bidding options for each scenario)

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Results – Average market prices




Fig. 3. Overview of development of average prices in different scenario groups depending on support scheme and trading behavior.

Results – Average market prices




Fig. 3. Overview of development of average prices in different scenario groups depending on support scheme and trading behavior.

Results – Price volatility




Fig. 5. Overview of development of standard deviation in different scenario groups depending on support scheme and trading behavior.

Results – Price volatility




Fig. 5. Overview of development of standard deviation in different scenario groups depending on support scheme and trading behavior.

Results – Price volatility




Fig. 7. Price ranges in different scenario groups depending on support scheme and trading behavior.

Results – Market values of renewables




Fig. 9. Development of absolute market value of onshore wind under different scenarios and support schemes.

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Conclusion and policy recommendations

- Capacity-based support schemes reduce impact of renewables on electricity markets most effectively
- But: When choosing the support instrument for renewables, the degree of market distortion is only one criterion
- Capacity-based support schemes create perverse incentives for plant design and are therefore probably not appropriate
- Well-designed sliding premium schemes might be a good compromise between a certain degree of market participation and low risks for plant operators
- System flexibility is crucial for market integration of renewables
- In systems with low must-run requirements the need for market-oriented support for renewables is substantially reduced

Thank you for your attention!



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